We define the BQS-UC model, a variant of the UC model, that deals with protocols in the bounded quantum storage model. We present a statistically secure commitment protocol in the BQS-UC model that composes concurrently with other protocols and an (a-priori) polynomially-bounded number of instances of itself. Our protocol has an efficient simulator which is important if one wishes to compose our protocol with protocols that are only computationally secure. Combining our result with prior results, we get a statistically BQS-UC secure constant-round protocol for general two-party computation without the need for any setup assumption.
Introduction
Since the inception of quantum key distribution by Bennett and Brassard [BB84] , it has been known that quantum communication permits to achieve protocol tasks that are impossible given only a classical channel. For example, a quantum key distribution scheme [BB84] permits to agree on a secret key that is statistically secret, using only an authenticated but not secret channel. (By statistical security we mean security against computationally unbounded adversaries, also known as information-theoretical security.) In contrast, when using only classical communication, it is easy to see that such a secret key can always be extracted by a computationally sufficiently powerful adversary. In light of this result, one might hope that quantum cryptography allows to circumvent other classical impossibility results, possibly even allowing for statistically secure multi-party computation protocols. Yet, Mayers [May97] showed that also in the quantum setting, even statistically secure commitment schemes are impossible, let alone general multi-party computation. This is unfortunate, because from commitments one can build OT (Bennett, Brassard, Crépeau, and Skubiszewska [BBCS91] ), and from OT general multi-party computation (Kilian [Kil88] ). A way to work around this impossibility was found by Damgård, Fehr, Salvail, and Schaffner [DFSS05] . They showed that if we assume that the quantum memory available to the adversary is bounded (we speak of bounded quantum storage (BQS)), we can construct statistically secure commitment and OT schemes. Although such a result is not truly unconditional, it avoids hard-to-justify complexity-theoretic assumptions. Also, it achieves long-term security: even if the adversary can surpass the memory bound after the protocol execution, this will not allow him to retroactively break the protocol.
Yet, we still have not reached the goal of statistically secure multi-party computation. Although we have protocols for commitment and OT, we cannot simply plug them into the protocols by Bennett et al. [BBCS91] and by Kilian [Kil88] . The reason is that it is not clear under which circumstances protocols in the BQS model may be composed. For example, Dziembowski and Maurer [DM04] constructed a protocol that is secure in the classical bounded storage model, but that looses security when composed with a computationally secure protocol. To overcome this remaining difficulty, works by Wehner and Wullschleger [WW08] and by Fehr and Schaffner [FS09] give security definitions in the BQS model that enable secure sequential composition. Both works also present secure OT protocols in their respective settings. Based on these, we can construct secure multi-party computation protocols in the BQS model. There are, however, a few limitations. First, since only sequential composition is supported, all instances of the OT protocol used by the multi-party computation need to be executed one after another, leading to a high round-complexity. Second, interactive functionalities such as a commitment are difficult to use: the restriction to sequential composability requires that we have to commit and immediately open a commitment before being allowed to execute the next commitment. Third, the security proof of their OT protocols uses a computationally unlimited simulator. As discussed in [Unr10] , a protocol with an unlimited simulator cannot be composed with a computationally secure protocol. Fourth, since we have no concurrent composability, it is not clear what happens if the protocols are executed in an environment where we do not have total control about which protocols are executed at what time.
To overcome the limitations of sequential composition in the classical setting, Canetti [Can01] introduced the Universal Composability (UC) model. In this model, protocols can be arbitrarily composed, even concurrently with other protocols and with copies of themselves. The UC model has been adapted to the quantum setting by Ben-Or and Mayers [BOM04] and by Unruh [Unr04, Unr10] . In light of the success of the UC model, it seems natural to combine the ideas of the UC model with those of the BQS model in order to allow for concurrent composition.
Our contribution.
We define the notion of BQS-UC-security, which is an extension of quantum-UC-security [Unr10] . We have composability in the following sense: If π is a secure realization of a functionality F, and σ F securely realizes G by using one instance of F, then σ π , the result of replacing F by π, still securely realizes G. In contrast to quantum-UC-security, however, BQS-UC-security does not allow for concurrent self-composition: if π is secure, this does not automatically imply that two concurrent instances of π are secure. 1 In order to get protocols that even self-compose concurrently, we design a commitment scheme π COM such that n concurrent instances of π COM securely realize n instances of the commitment functionality in the presence of a-memory bounded adversaries. Here a and n are arbitrary (polynomially-bounded), but the protocol depends on a and n.
The challenging part in the construction of π COM is that BQS-UC-security requires the following: There must be an efficient simulator (which is allowed to have more quantum memory than the adversary) that can extract the committed value (extractability) or change it after the commit phase (equivocality). Prior constructions of commitment schemes in the BQS model required computationally unbounded simulators. Also, the fact that we directly analyze the concurrent composition of several instances of π COM requires care: In the proof, we have hybrid networks in which instances of both π COM and of the simulator occur. Since the simulator uses more quantum memory than π COM tolerates, one needs to ensure that the simulator cannot be (mis)used by the adversary to break the commitment.
Finally, using the composition theorem and π COM , for any two-party functionality G, we get a statistically secure protocol π realizing G in the BQS model. 2 The protocol is secure even when running n concurrent instances of the protocol. (Again, this holds for any n and any memory bound, but the protocol depends on n and the memory-bound.) The protocol is constant-round. It does not use any quantum memory or quantum computation and thus is in the reach of today's technology.
Preliminaries
General. A nonnegative function µ is called negligible if for all c > 0 and all sufficiently large k, µ(k) < k −c . µ is called exponentially-small if for some c > 0 and sufficiently large k, µ(k) < c −k . A nonnegative function f is called overwhelming if f ≥ 1 − µ for some negligible µ. Keywords in typewriter font (e.g., environment) are assumed to be fixed but arbitrary distinct non-empty words in {0, 1} * . ε ∈ {0, 1} * denotes the empty word. We write for the concatenation of bitstrings. Given a bitstring x, we write x I for x restricted to the indices in the set I. Given a set M , we write M ∁ for its complement. A b-block (m, κ, d)-linear code is a code with alphabet {0, 1} b (that is, each symbol of the code is a b-bit string), codewords of length m (i.e., mb bits), size 2 bκ , and detecting d − 1 errors (i.e., any non-zero codeword contains at least d non-zero blocks). The Hamming distance between x and x * we denote ω(x, x * ). (In the case of a block code, this is the number of blocks, not bits, that differ.) We say a family of (m, κ, d)-linear codes, parametrized by a security parameter k, has efficient error-correction if for any x, the codeword x * with ω(x, x * ) ≤ (d − 1)/2 can be found in deterministic time polynomial in k (if such an x * exists).
Quantum systems. We can only give a terse overview over the formalism used in quantum computing. For a thorough introduction, we recommend the textbook by Nielsen and Chuang [NC00, Chap. 1-2]. A (pure) state in a quantum system is described by a vector |ψ in some Hilbert space H. In this work, we only use Hilbert spaces of the form H = N for some countable set N , usually N = {0, 1} for qubits or N = {0, 1} * for bitstrings. We always assume a designated orthonormal basis {|x : x ∈ N } for each Hilbert space, called the computational basis. The basis states |x represent classical states (i.e., states without superposition). Given several separate subsystems H 1 = N 1 , . . . , H n = Nn , we describe the joint system by the tensor product H 1 ⊗· · ·⊗H n = N 1 ×···×Nn . We write Ψ| for the linear transformation mapping |Φ to the scalar product Ψ|Φ . Consequently, |Ψ Ψ| denotes the orthogonal projector on |Ψ . We set |0 + := |0 ,
(|0 + |1 ), and
(|0 − |1 ). For x ∈ {0, 1} n and θ ∈ {+, ×} n , we define |x θ := |x 1 θ 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |x n θn .
Mixed states. If a system is not in a single pure state, but instead is in the pure state |Ψ i ∈ H with probability p i (i.e., it is in a mixed state), we describe the system by a density operator ρ = i p i |Ψ i Ψ i | over H. This representation contains all physically observable information about the distribution of states, but some distributions are not distinguishable by any measurement and thus are represented by the same mixed state. The set of all density operators is the set of all positive 3 operators H with trace 1, and is denoted P(H). Composed systems are descibed by operators in P(H 1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ H n ). In the following, when speaking about (quantum) states, we always mean mixed states in the density operator representation. A mapping E : P(H 1 ) → P(H 2 ) represents a physically possible operation (realizable by a sequence of unitary transformations, measurements, and initializations and removals of qubits) iff it is a completely positive trace preserving map. 4 We call such mappings superoperators. The superoperator E m init on P(H) with H := {0,1} * and m ∈ {0, 1} * is defined by E m init (ρ) := |m m| for all ρ.
Composed systems. Given a superoperator E on P(H 1 ), the superoperator E ⊗id operates on P(H 1 ⊗ H 2 ). Instead of saying "we apply E ⊗ id ", we say "we apply E to H 1 ". If we say "we initialize H with m", we mean "we apply E m init to H". Given a state ρ ∈ P(H 1 ⊗ H 2 ), let ρ x := (|x x| ⊗ id)ρ(|x x| ⊗ id ). Then the outcome of measuring H 1 in the computational basis is x with probability tr ρ x , and after measuring x, the quantum state is ρx tr ρx . Since we will only perform measurements in the computational basis in this work, we will omit the qualification "in the computational basis". The terminology in this paragraph generalizes to systems composed of more than two subsystems.
Classical states. Classical probability distributions P : N → [0, 1] over a countable set N are represented by density operators ρ ∈ P( N ) with ρ = x∈N P (x)|x x| where {|x } is the computational basis. We call a state classical if it is of this form. We thus have a canonical isomorphism between the classical states over N and the probability distributions 3 We call an operator positive if it is Hermitean and has only nonnegative Eigenvalues. 4 A map E is completely positive iff for all Hilbert spaces H ′ , and all positive operators ρ on H1 ⊗ H ′ , (E ⊗ id)(ρ) is positive.
over N . We call a superoperator E : P( N 1 ) → P( N 2 ) classical iff if there is a randomized function F : M denotes the security parameter. The Hilbert space H state represents the state kept by the machine between invocations, and H class and H quant are used both for incoming and outgoing messages. Any message consists of a classical part stored in H class and a quantum part stored in H quant . If a machine id sender wishes to send a message with classical part m and quantum part |Ψ to a machine id rcpt , the machine id sender initializes H class with (id sender , id rcpt , m) and H quant with |Ψ . (See the definition of the network execution below for details.) The separation of messages into a classical and a quantum part is for clarity only, all information could also be encoded directly in a single register. If a machine does not wish to send a message, it initializes H class and H quant with the empty word ε.
A network N is a set of machines with pairwise distinct identities containing a machine Z with id Z = environment. We write ids N for the set of the identities of the machines in N.
We call a machine M quantum-polynomial-time if there is a uniform 5 sequence of quantum circuits C k such that for all k, the circuit C k implements the superoperator E The output of the network N on input z and security parameter k is described by the following algorithm: Let ρ ∈ P(H N ) be the state that is initialized to (ε, environment, z) in H class , and to the empty word ε in all other registers. Then repeat the following indefinitely: Apply E (k) N to ρ. Measure H class . If the outcome is of the form (environment, ε, out ), return 5 A sequence of circuits C k is uniform if a deterministic Turing machine can output the description of C k in time polynomial in k.
out and terminate. Otherwise, continue the loop. The probability distribution of the return value out is denoted by Exec N (k, z).
Corruptions. To model corruptions, we introduce corruption parties, special machines that follow the instructions given by the adversary. When invoked, the corruption party P C id with identity id measures H class and parses the outcome as (id sender , id rcpt , m). If id sender = adversary, H class is initialized with m. (In this case, m specifies both the message and the sender/recipient. Thus the adversary can instruct a corruption party to send to arbitrary recipients.) Otherwise, H class is initialized with (id , adversary, (id sender , id rcpt , m)). (The message is forwarded to the adversary.) Note that, since P C id does not touch the H quant , the quantum part of the message is forwarded.
Given a network N, and a set of identities C, we write N C for the set resulting from replacing each machine M ∈ N with identity id ∈ C by P C id . Security model. A protocol π is a set of machines with environment, adversary / ∈ ids(π). We assume a set of identities parties π ⊆ ids(π) to be associated with π. parties π denotes which of the machines in the protocol are actually protocol parties (as opposed to incorruptible entities such as ideal functionalities).
An environment is a machine with identity environment, an adversary or a simulator is a machine with identity adversary (there is no formal distinction between adversaries and simulators, the two terms refer to different intended roles of a machine).
In the following we call two networks ε-indistinguishable if for all z ∈ {0, 1} * and k ∈ AE,
We call two networks indistinguishable if they are ε-indistinguishable for negligible ε. We speak of perfect indistinguishability if ε = 0.
Without assuming a memory bound, this leads to the following definition of quantum-UC-security: 6 Definition 1 (Quantum-UC-security [Unr10] ) Let protocols π and ρ be given. We say π quantum-UC-emulates ρ iff for every set C ⊆ parties π and for every adversary Adv there is a simulator Sim such that for every environment Z, the networks π C ∪{Adv, Z} (called the real model) and ρ C ∪ {Sim, Z} (called the ideal model) are indistinguishable. We furthermore require that if Adv is quantum-polynomial-time, so is Sim.
The BQS-UC model
In order to define BQS-UC, we first need a definition of a memory-bounded machine. We call a machine M b-memory bounded if the machine never stores more than b qubits between invocations. We stress that we do not impose any bound on the classical memory. 
M . We write QM(M ) for the smallest a such that M is a-memory bounded.
We can now formulate BQS-UC-security. Intuitively, a protocol is BQS-UC-secure if it is UC-secure for memory-bounded adversaries. To formulate this, we need to explicitly parametrize the definition over a memory bound a. Then we require that the total quantum memory used by environment and adversary is bounded by a. The reason why we include the environment's memory is that the latter can be involved in the actual attack: If only the adversary's memory was bounded, the adversary could use the environment as an external storage to perform the attack. 7 It remains to decide whether the simulator should be memory bounded. If we allow the simulator to be unbounded, composition becomes difficult: In some cases, the simulator of one protocol plays the role of the adversary of a second protocol. Thus, if simulators where not memory bounded, the second protocol would have to be secure against unbounded adversaries. However, if we require the simulator to be a-memory bounded, we will not be able to construct nontrivial protocols: In order to perform a simulation, the simulator needs to have some advantage over an honest protocol participant (in the computational UC setting, e.g., this is usually the knowledge of some trapdoor). In our setting, the advantage of the simulator will be that he has more quantum memory than the adversary. Thus we introduce a second parameter s which specifies the amount of quantum memory the simulator may use for the simulation. More precisely, we allow the simulator to use s + QM(Adv) qubits because the simulator will usually internally simulate the adversary Adv as a black-box and therefore have to additionally reserve sufficient quantum memory to store the adversary's state. Proof. Reflexivity and monotonicity follow directly from Definition 3. To show transitivity, assume that π (a, s)-BQS-UC emulates ρ and ρ (a + s, s ′ )-BQS-UC emulates σ. Fix an adversary Adv and an environment Z with QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a. To show that π (a, s + s ′ )-BQS-UC-emulates σ we need to show that there exists a simulator Sim that is independent of Z and that satisfies QM(Sim) ≤ s + s ′ + QM(Adv).
Since π (a, s)-BQS-UC emulates ρ, there exists a simulator Sim ′ (independent of Z) with QM(Sim 
The proof of (iv) depends on the concept of the dummy-adversary introduced in the next section; we defer the proof until Section 2.4. (Note that the proofs in the next section do not use (iv).)
Ideal functionalities
In most cases, the behavior of the ideal model is described by a single machine F, the socalled ideal functionality. We can think of this functionality as a trusted third party that perfectly implements the desired protocol behavior. For example, the functionality F OT for oblivious transfer would take as input from Alice two bitstrings m 0 , m 1 , and from Bob a bit c, and send to Bob the bitstring m c . Obviously, such a functionality constitutes a secure oblivious transfer. We can thus define a protocol π to be a secure OT protocol if π quantum-UC-emulates F OT where F OT denotes the protocol consisting only of one machine, the functionality F OT itself. There is, however, one technical difficulty here. In the real protocol π, the bitstring m c is sent to the environment Z by Bob, while in the ideal model, m c is sent by the functionality. Since every message is tagged with the sender of that message, Z can distinguish between the real and the ideal model merely by looking at the sender of m c . To solve this issue, we need to ensure that F sends the message m c in the name of Bob (and for analogous reasons, that F receives messages sent by Z to Alice or Bob). To achieve this, we use so-called dummy-parties [Can01] in the ideal model. These are parties with the identities of Alice and Bob that just forward messages between the functionality and the environment.
Definition 5 (Dummy-party) Let a machine P and a functionality F be given. The dummy-partyP for P and F is a machine that has the same identity as P and has the following state transition operator: Let id F be the identity of F. When activated, measure H class . If the outcome of the measurement is of the form (environment, id P , m), initialize H class with (id P , id F , m). If the outcome is of the form (id F , id P , m), initialize H class with (id P , environment, m).
In all cases, the quantum communication register is not modified (i.e., the message in that register is forwarded).
Note the strong analogy to the corruption parties (page 2.1).
Thus, if we write π quantum-UC-emulates F, we mean that π quantum-UC-emulates ρ F where ρ F consists of the functionality F and the dummy-parties corresponding to the parties in π. More precisely:
Definition 6 Let π be a protocol and F be a functionality. We say that π quantum-UCemulates F if π quantum-UC-emulates ρ F where ρ F := {P : P ∈ parties π } ∪ {F}.
Dummy-adversary
In the definition of UC-security, we have three entities interacting with the protocol: the adversary, the simulator, and the environment. Both the adversary and the environment are all-quantified, hence we would expect that they do, in some sense, work together. This intuition is backed by the following fact which was first noted by Canetti [Can01] : Without loss of generality, we can assume an adversary that is completely controlled by the environment. This so-called dummy-adversary only forwards messages between the environment and the protocol. The actual attack is then executed by the environment. Proof of Lemma 8. In [Unr10] , an analogous theorem has been shown for quantum-UCsecurity. Our proof is essentially the same, except that we additionally have to check that the machines we construct satisfy the required memory bounds.
Assume that π (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates ρ with respect to the dummy-adversary. Fix an adversary Adv. We have to show that there exists a simulator Sim with QM(Sim) ≤ s + QM(Adv) such that for all environments Z with QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a we have that π ∪ {Adv, Z} and ρ ∪ {Sim, Z} are indistinguishable. Furthermore, if Adv is quantumpolynomial-time, Sim has to be quantum-polynomial-time, too.
For a given environment Z with QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a, we construct an environment Z Adv that is supposed to interact with Adv dummy and internally simulates Z and Adv, and that routes all messages sent by the simulated Adv to π through Adv dummy and vice versa. 
networks (II) and (III).) Since Adv dummy is quantum-polynomial-time, so is Sim
′ . We construct a machine Sim that internally simulates Sim ′ and Adv (network (IV)). Then ρ∪{Sim ′ , Z Adv } and ρ∪{Sim, Z} are perfectly indistinguishable. Summarizing, π ∪ {Adv, Z} and ρ ∪ {Sim, Z} are indistinguishable for all environments Z. Furthermore, since Sim ′ is quantum-polynomial-time, we have that Sim is quantum-polynomial-time if Adv is. And QM(Sim
Using Lemma 8, we can now prove the deferred Lemma 4 (iv).
Proof of Lemma 4 (iv)
. If the π (∞, s)-BQS-UC-emulates ρ, then π trivially quantum-UCemulates ρ (the condition QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ ∞ is trivially fulfilled).
Assume that π quantum-UC-emulates ρ. Then there is a simulator Sim such that for any environment Z, π ∪ {Adv dummy , Z} and ρ ∪ {Sim, Z} are indistinguishable. Since Adv dummy 
Composition
For some protocol σ, and some protocol π, by σ π we denote the protocol where σ invokes (up to polynomially many) instances of π. That is, in σ π the machines from σ and from π run together in one network, and the machines from σ access the inputs and outputs of π. (That is, σ plays the role of the environment from the point of view of π. In particular, Z then talks only to σ and not to the subprotocol π directly.) A typical situation would be that σ F is some protocol that makes use of some ideal functionality F, say a commitment functionality, and then σ π would be the protocol resulting from implementing that functionality with some protocol π, say a commitment protocol. One would hope that such an implementation results in a secure protocol σ π . That is, we hope that if π BQS-UC-emulates F and σ F BQS-UCemulates G, then σ π BQS-UC-emulates G. Fortunately, this is the case, as long as we pick the memory bounds in the right way:
Theorem 9 (Composition Theorem) Let π, ρ, and σ be quantum-polynomial-time protocols. Assume that σ invokes at most n subprotocol instances (n may depend on the security
Proof of Theorem 9. In [Unr10] , an analogous theorem has been shown for quantum-UCsecurity. Our proof is essentially the same, except that we additionally have to check that the machines we construct satisfy the required memory bounds. Since σ is quantum-polynomial-time, σ invokes at most a polynomial number of instances of its subprotocol π or ρ. We can thus assume that n is polynomially-bounded. Since π (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates ρ, there is a quantum-polynomial-time simulator Sim ′ with QM(Sim ′ ) ≤ s such that for all environments Z with QM(Z) = QM(Z) + QM(Adv dummy ) ≤ a we have that π ∪ {Adv dummy , Z} and ρ ∪ {Sim ′ , Z} are indistinguishable. In the following, we call Sim ′ the dummy-simulator. Let a quantum-polynomial-time adversary Adv be given (that is supposed to attack σ π ). We construct a simulator Sim that internally simulates the adversary Adv and n instances Sim ′ 1 , . . . , Sim ′ n of the dummy-simulator Sim ′ . The simulated adversary Adv is connected to the environment and to the protocol σ, but all messages between Adv and the i-th instance π i of π are routed through the dummy-simulator-instance Sim ′ i (which is then supposed to transform these messages into a form suitable for instances of ρ). The simulator Sim is depicted by the dashed box in network (II) in Figure 2 . We have QM(Sim) ≤ ns.
We have to show that for any environment Z with QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a − QM(σ) − (n − 1)b we have that σ π ∪ {Adv, Z} and σ ρ ∪ {Sim, Z} are indistinguishable (networks (I) and (II) in Figure 2 ).
For this, we construct a hybrid environment Z σ,i . (Z σ,i is depicted as the dashed box in network (III) in Figure 2 .) This environment internally simulates the machines Z, Adv, the protocol σ, instances π 1 , . . . , π i−1 of the real protocol π, and instances Sim ′ i+1 , . . . , Sim ′ n and ρ i+1 , . . . , ρ n of the dummy-simulator Sim ′ and the ideal protocol ρ, respectively. The communication between Z, Adv, and σ is directly forwarded by Z σ,i . Communication between Adv and the j-th protocol instance is forwarded as follows: If j < i, the communication is simply forwarded to π j . If j > i, the communication is routed through the corresponding dummy-simulator Sim ′ j (which is then supposed to transform these messages into a form suitable for ρ j ). And finally, if j = i, the communication is passed to the adversary/simulator outside of Z σ,i . Communication between σ and the instances of π or ρ is directly forwarded.
Since Z σ,i internally simulates one copy of Z, one copy of Adv, one copy of σ, i − 1 copies of π, and n − i copies of Sim ′ and ρ. Thus
We will now show that there is a negligible function µ such that
for any security parameter k and any i = 1, . . . , n. For this, we construct an environment Z σ which expects as its initial input a pair (i, z), and then runs Z σ,i with input z. Since QM(Z σ,i ) ≤ a, we have QM(Z σ ) ≤ a. Since π ∪ {Adv dummy , Z} and ρ ∪ {Sim ′ , Z} are indistinguishable for all quantum-polynomial-time environments Z with QM(Z) ≤ a, π ∪ {Adv dummy , Z σ } and ρ ∪ {Sim ′ , Z σ } are indistinguishable. Hence there exists a negligible function µ such that the difference of Pr[
The game Exec π∪{Adv dummy ,Z σ,i } (k, z) is depicted as network (III) in Figure 2 (except that we wrote π i instead of π). Observe that Exec ρ∪{Sim ′ ,Z σ,i+1 } (k, z) (note the changed index i+1) contains the same machines as Exec π∪{Adv dummy ,Z σ,i } (k, z) (when unfolding the simulation performed by Z σ,i into individual machines) except for the difference that the communication with the i-th instance of π is routed through the dummy-adversary Adv dummy . However, the latter just forwards messages, so π ∪ {Adv dummy , Z σ,i } and ρ ∪ {Sim ′ , Z σ,i+1 } are perfectly indistinguishable.
Using the triangle inequality, it follows that |Pr[Exec π∪{Adv dummy ,Zσ,n} (k, z)
| is bounded by n · µ(k) which is negligible. Moreover, Exec π∪{Adv dummy ,Zσ,n} (k, z) and Exec σ π ∪{Adv,Z} (k, z) describe the same game (up to unfolding of simulated submachines and up to one instance of the dummy-adversary). Similarly, Exec ρ∪{Sim ′ ,Z σ,1 } (k, z) and Exec σ ρ ∪{Sim,Z} (k, z) describe the same game (up to unfolding of simulated submachines). Thus Pr[Exec σ π ∪{Adv,Z} (k, z) = 1] − Pr[Exec σ ρ ∪{Sim,Z} (k, z) = 1] is negligible and thus σ π ∪ {Adv, Z} and σ ρ ∪ {Sim, Z} are indistinguishable. Furthermore, since Sim ′ is quantum-polynomial-time, we have that Sim is quantum-polynomial-time if Adv is. As mentioned above, QM(Sim) ≤ ns.
Since this holds for all Z with QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a − QM(σ) − (n − 1)b, and the construction of Sim does not depend on Z, we have that
Theorem 10 (Composition Theorem) Let π and σ be quantum-polynomial-time protocols and F and G be quantum-polynomial-time functionalities. Assume that σ invokes at most one subprotocol instance. Assume that π (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates F and that
The proof of this theorem is very similar to that in [Unr10] , except that we have to keep track of the quantum memory used by various machines constructed in the proof. Proof. From Theorem 9, with n = 1, we get that
Notice that in the composition theorem (Theorem 10), the outer protocol σ is only allowed to invoke one instance of the subprotocol π. This stands in contrast to the universal composition theorem for classical-UC [Can01] and for quantum-UC [Unr10] where any polynomially-bounded number of concurrent instances of π is allowed. In fact, this is not just a limitation of our proof technique. 9 For example, assume a protocol π A→B COM that (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates the commitment functionality F A→B COM with sender A and recipient B. Assume further that π A→B COM does not use any functionalities as setup. As we will see later, such a protocol exists. Now let π B→A COM be the protocol that results from exchanging the roles of A and B. Then π B→A COM (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates F B→A COM . Consider the concurrent composition of π A→B COM and π B→A COM . In this protocol, a corrupted Bob may reroute all messages between the Alice in the first protocol and Alice in the second protocol. Thus, if Alice commits to a random value v in the first protocol, Bob commits to the same value v in the second protocol without knowing it. It is easy to see that in a concurrent composition of F A→B COM and F B→A COM , this is not possible. Thus the composition of π A→B COM and π B→A COM does not (a ′ , s ′ )-BQS-UCemulate the composition of F A→B COM and F B→A COM (for any parameters a ′ , s ′ ). To convert this into an example of a protocol that does not even compose with itself, just consider the protocol π A↔B COM in which Bob may choose whether F A→B COM or F B→A COM should be executed. It might be possible to make π A↔B COM self-composable by adding suitable tags inside the messages, but the definition of BQS-UC-security does not enforce this.
Although BQS-UC-security does not guarantee for concurrent self-composability, individual protocols may have this property. In order to formulate this, we introduce the concept of the multi-session variant of a protocol. Given a protocol π and a polynomially-bounded n, we define π n to be the protocol that executes n instances of π concurrently.
Then, from Theorem 10, we immediately get the following corollary:
Corollary 11 Let π and σ be quantum-polynomial-time protocols and F and G be quantumpolynomial-time functionalities. Assume that σ invokes at most m subprotocol instances.
Assume that π nm (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates F nm and that
Quantum lifting
In [Unr10] , it has been shown that for classical protocols, classical-UC-security implies quantum-UC-security (quantum lifting theorem). This theorem is very useful when reusing results from the classical-UC setting: For example, if a classical protocol σ F classical-UCemulates a functionality G, and a quantum protocol π quantum-UC-emulates F, then the quantum lifting theorem gives us that σ F quantum-UC-emulates G, and then by the composition theorem σ π quantum-UC-emulates G.
A similar result also holds for BQS-UC:
Theorem 12 (Quantum lifting) If π and ρ are classical protocols and π classical-UCemulates ρ, then π (∞, 0)-BQS-UC emulates ρ.
Proof. In [Unr10] , an analogous theorem has been shown for quantum-UC-security. Our proof is essentially the same, except that we additionally have to check that the simulator Sim we construct has QM(Sim) = 0. However, since Sim is a classical machine, this is trivial.
Given a machine M , let C(M ) denote the machine which behaves like M , but measures incoming messages in the computational basis before processing them, and measures outgoing messages in the computational basis. More precisely, the superoperator E
M on H state ⊗ H class ⊗ H quant , and then again invokes E class on H class ⊗ H quant . Since it is possible to simulate quantum Turing machines on classical Turing machines (with an exponential overhead), for every machine M , there exists a classical machine M ′ such that C(M ) and M ′ are perfectly indistinguishable. 10 We define the classical dummy-adversary Adv class dummy to be the classical machine that is defined like Adv dummy (Definition 7), except that in each invocation, it first measures H class , H quant , and H state in the computational basis (i.e., it applies E class to H state ⊗H class ⊗H quant ) and then proceeds as does Adv dummy . Note that Adv class dummy is probabilistic-polynomial-time. By Lemma 8, we only need to show that for any set C of corrupted parties, there exists a quantum-polynomial-time machine Sim with QM(Sim) ≤ 0 + QM(Adv dummy ) = 0 such that for every machine Z, the real model π C ∪ {Z, Adv dummy } and the ideal model ρ C ∪ {Z, Sim} are indistinguishable.
The protocol π is classical, thus π C is classical, too, and thus all messages forwarded by Adv dummy from π C to Z have been measured in the computational basis by π C , and all messages forwarded by Adv dummy from Z to π C will be measured by π C before being used. Thus, if Adv would additionally measure all messages it forwards in the computational basis, the view of Z would not be modified. More formally, π C ∪ {Z, Adv dummy } and π C ∪ {Z, Adv 
Commitments

Extractable commitments
In this section, we present the notion of online-extractable commitments in the BQS model. These will be used as a building block for constructing BQS-UC commitments in the next section. Instead of the binding property, we will need a stronger property: online-extractability. This property guarantees that there is a machine (the extractor ) that, when running as the recipient of the commit protocol, is able to output the committed value V already after the commit phase. This extractor should be indistinguishable from an honest recipient. Note that this does not contradict (ε, a)-BQS-hiding since we allow the extractor's quantum memory to contain more than a qubits. For our purposes, we will only need a definition of onlineextractability that does not impose a memory bound on the adversary. We do, however, make the memory bound s of the extractor explicit. 1. Alice picks a random x ∈ {0, 1} n and θ ∈ {+, ×} n . Then she encodes and sends each bit x i in the basis θ i , i.e., she sends |Ψ := |x θ to Bob. 2. Bob picks a randomθ ∈ {0, 1} n and measures the i-th qubit of |Ψ in basis θ i . Call the outcomesx i . 3. Both parties wait until the quantum memory bound becomes effective. 11 4. Alice sends θ to Bob and outputs x. 5. Bob computes I := {i : θ i =θ i } and outputs (I,x I ). for what they call a weak string exchange (WSE). A WSE is a protocol between Alice and Bob after which Alice outputs a bitstring X and Bob outputs a set of indices I and the bitstring X I consisting of X restricted to the indices I. The properties guaranteed by a weak string exchange are -informally -that Bob does not learn too much about X I ∁ , and that Alice has no information about I. From a WSE, we can construct a commitment scheme as follows: If Alice wishes to commit to a string m, Alice and Bob perform a WSE. Then Alice sends m ⊕ F (X) to Bob where F is a universal hash function with suitable parameters. Furthermore, Alice sends S(X), the syndrome of X under a suitable linear code. Since Bob only learns X I , S(X), and little about X I ∁ , the string X has high min-entropy from Bob's point of view. Thus F (X) looks random to Bob and the commitment is hiding. To open the commitment, Alice sends X. Since she does not know I, Alice will be detected if she sends anX that is substantially different from X. If Alice sends anX that differs from X only at a few indices, the syndromes S(X) and S(X) will not match. Thus Alice is forced to send X = X; the commitment is binding. The precise protocols are given in Figures 3 and 4 .
The hiding property of π KWW has already been proven in [KWW09] , we only need to specialize their result to the BQS model. Proof. In [KWW09] , the notion of an (n, λ, ε ′ )-WSE protocol is introduced. Here n is the length of the exchanged string, and λn lower bounds the knowledge that Bob has about the string (in terms of min-entropy, and up to an error probability ε ′ ). The precise definition is given in [KWW09] ; for the present proof we will not need any details. Their definition is parametrized by an operator F that describes the evolution of the quantum state in Bob's memory. To model the special case of the BQS model in which the adversary's memory has a qubits, we have to choose F to be the identity on a-qubit states. Let P F succ (n ′ ) := max (Dx)x,(ρx)x 1 2 n ′ x∈{0,1} n ′ tr D x F(ρ x ) where (D x ) x goes over all POVMs (measurements), and (ρ x ) x over all families of a-qubit mixed states. Intuitively, P F succ (n ′ ) denotes the maximum Parameters: Integers ℓ (the length of the committed value), n < ℓ, and κ, d ≤ n. A binary (n, κ, d)-linear code where S(ω) ∈ {0, 1} n−κ denotes the syndrome of a codeword ω ∈ {0, 1} n . A family F of universal hash functions F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} ℓ . All parameters may depend on the security parameter k. Subprotocols: The n-bit WSE protocol from probability of correctly decoding a random n ′ -bit string after it has been stored in an a qubit state. In [KW09, page 1] it is shown that P F succ (n ′ ) ≤ 2 −n ′ (R−1) = 2 −a+n ′ for R := a n ′ . By [KWW09, Theorem 3.2], for any constant δ ∈ (0, 1 2 ), we have that π WSE is an (n, λ, ε ′ )-WSE protocol where λ −→ − 1 n log P F succ ( 1 2 − δ)n and ε ′ = 2e
, in the formula for λ, the log is missing, but their proof reveals this to be a typo.) We have that lim λ ≥ − lim 1 n log 2
Since π WSE is an (n, λ, ε ′ )-WSE protocol it is also an (n, λ, ε ′′ )-WSE protocol. Furthermore, ℓ ≤ λn − (n − κ)− 2 log 1/ε ′′ . Then, by [KWW09, Lemma 4.3], 12 if π WSE is an (n, λ, ε ′′ )-WSE protocol, then π KWW is (ε, a)-BQS-hiding with ε := 3ε ′′ . 13 Since δ is constant and n ≥ k, we have that ε ′ and hence also ε = 3 max{2 −k/2 , ε ′ } is exponentially-small.
We proceed to show that π KWW is online-extractable. Since König et. only showed the binding property, we need to extend the proof of [KWW09] . The main ideas are, however, already present in [KWW09] . Intuitively, online-extractability of π KWW is not surprising: If Bob has an unbounded amount of quantum memory, he can delay the measurement of the qubits in π WSE and thus get all the bits x i . That is, π WSE is online-extractable. Then, in π KWW , Bob will know x already in the commit phase and can thus compute v = p ⊕ F (x) (after error-correcting x to match the syndrome σ). Since v is the committed value, this implies that π KWW is online-extractable. To make this argument formal, we need to ensure that even if Alice cheats, she is not able to send somex in the open phase which differs from the value x that Bob extracted. The proof of this fact is similar to the proof of the binding property in [KWW09] .
We begin by making the fact formal that Bob (given sufficient quantum memory) can extract in π WSE . Note that in this definition, we do not require the extractor B WSE S to produce the set I. Instead, in an execution of A ′ and B WSE S , we choose I randomly. Alternatively, we could also let B WSE S pick I and require that I is uniformly random and independent of x and the state of A ′ ; this would lead to an equivalent definition.
The definition could be generalized by allowing an error ε; we would then require that the trace distance ε between ρ A ′ B and σ A ′ IX I is bounded by ε. For our purposes, however, the present definition is sufficient.
Lemma 17 (Online-extractability of π WSE ) π WSE is n-online-extractable. (Here n is as in Figure 3 .) [KWW09, Theorem 3.5] states a weaker property (called "security for Bob"). The proof of that theorem, however, explicitly constructs a simulator and proves the properties required by Definition 16. 15 Thus, their proof also constitutes a proof for our Lemma 17.
Given an online-extractable WSE protocol, we get an online-extractable commitment scheme: 
. From the construction of π KWW , we have that P fail is upper bounded by the probability thatx = x * and S(x) = σ andx I = x I . Fix somex, x * withx = x * and S(x) = σ. From S(x) = σ = S(x * ) we have S(x−x * ) = 0. Hencex−x * has Hamming-weight at least d. Thus 14 The names of the states ρ A ′ B and σ A ′ IX I are chosen to better match the notation in [KWW09] . 15 In the current revision of [KWW09] , there is a mistake in the proof of Theorem 3.5. (At some point in the proof, it is used that I is independent of (TX n Θ n ) which cannot be justified.) The proof can, however, be fixed. The authors of [KWW09] are aware of the problem and will correct the proof in the next revision.
In the case where v ′ = ⊥, we have ω(x, x * ) > (d − 1)/2 for all x * and hence ω(x,x) > (d − 1)/2 and hence ω(x,x) ≥ d/2.) Since I is chosen independently of x,x, and each i is in I with probability 1 2 , it follows that x I =x I with probability at most (
Combining our results on π WSE and π KWW , we get the following theorem: Let S be the syndrome of the (n, κ, d)-Reed-Solomon code. Let F be a family of universal hash functions F : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} ℓ . Such functions exist for any n, ℓ; for example, the set of all affine transformations from {0, 1} n to {0, 1} ℓ is easily seen to be strongly universal.
Since
by Lemma 15, we have that π KWW is (ε 1 , a)-BQS-hiding for some exponentially-small ε 1 .
And with s := n, by Lemmas 17 and 18, we get that π KWW is (s, ε 2 )-online-extractable with ε := 2 d/2 .
Since both ε 1 and ε 2 are exponentially-small, the theorem holds with ε := max{ε 1 , ε 2 }.
BQS-UC commitments
In this section, we present a commitment scheme π COM that is BQS-UC-secure for memory bound a and for n concurrent instances of π COM . The parameters a and n can be arbitrary, but π COM depends on them. To state our result, we first define the ideal functionality for commitments. The protocol π COM is depicted in Figure 5 . Before we prove its security, we first explain the underlying intuition. In order to prove the BQS-UC-security of π COM , it is necessary to construct a simulator (that may use more quantum memory than the adversary) that achieves the following: When being in the role of the recipient, the simulator is able to extract the commitment after the commit phase. When being in the role of the sender, the simulator should be able to open the commitment to any value of his choosing (equivocality).
The first requirement can easily be achieved by using the online-extractable commitment scheme from Theorem 19. That scheme, however, is not equivocal. In order to make our protocol equivocal, we intentionally weaken the binding property of the commitment. Instead of committing to a single value v, the sender commits using a commitment scheme C 2 to random values R := R 1 , . . . , R n . Then he sends v ⊕ F (R) with F being a universal hash function and sends the syndrome σ of R with respect to a suitable linear code. In the open phase, the sender does not open all commitments R i , but instead just sends R to the recipient. The recipient chooses a test set T , and the sender opens R i for i ∈ T . The modified scheme is still binding: Assume the sender wishes to be able to open the commitment with two different values. Then he has to find values R ′ = R that both pass the recipients checks in the open phase. If R ′ differs from R in many blocks R i , with high probability the verifier will require that one of these R i is opened and the sender will be caught. If R ′ and R differs in only few blocks, then R − R ′ has a low Hamming weight and it not in the code. Hence the syndrome of R − R ′ is not zero, and, since the code is linear, the syndromes of R ′ and R cannot both equal σ. Thus the sender is caught, too. Furthermore, our scheme is online-extractable if C 2 since the simulator can extract the committed values R. However, we have not yet achieved the equivocality. In order to open the commitment to a different value, the sender needs to know T before sending R ′ . To achieve this, the recipient commits to T before the commit phase (using an online-extractable commitment scheme C 2 ). A simulator wishing to change the value of the commitment simply extracts T . Then he knows which R i can be changed without being detected and can thus change F (R 1 , . . . , R n ) to any value he wishes.
Lemma 21 Assume that ǫ, δ are negligible, n, c are polynomially-bounded, and 2κb − mb − 2cb − ℓ is superlogarithmic (in the security parameter k). Assume that C 1 is (ε, s 1 )-onlineextractable and C 2 is (δ, a + ns 1 )-BQS-hiding. Assume that F is a family of affine strongly universal hash functions.
Then π n COM (a, ns 1 )-BQS-UC-emulates (F A→B,ℓ COM ) n for corrupted recipient B. Proof. First, we describe the structure of the real and ideal model in the case that the party B (Bob) is corrupted:
In the real model, we have the environment Z, the adversary Adv, the honest party A (Alice), the corruption party B C . The adversary controls the corruption party B C , so effectively he controls the communication between Alice and Bob. The environment provides Alice's inputs (commit, v) and open. See Figure 6 (a) .
In the ideal model, we have the environment Z, the simulator Sim (to be defined below), the dummy-partyÃ, the corruption party B C , and the commitment functionality Fix an adversary Adv. To show Lemma 21, we need to find a simulator Sim with QM(Sim) ≤ ns 1 such that, for any environment Z with QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a, the real model and the ideal model are indistinguishable. This simulator is described in Figure 7 . We use the abbreviations R := R 1 . . . R m and R ′ := R ′ 1 . . . R ′ m . To show that the real and the ideal model are indistinguishable, we start with the real model, and change the machines in the real model step-by-step until we end up with the ideal model. In each step, we show that the network before and after that step are indistinguishable.
Game 1. We change the machine A as follows: Instead of executing the program of the honest recipient of C 1 , A executes the extractor A S . Let T ′ denote the extracted value. The modified A does not use T ′ . Since there are up to n copies of A, and since C 1 is (ε, s 1 )-online-extractable, the real model and Game 1 are nε-indistinguishable.
Game 2. We change the machine A to abort if the opening of T succeeds and reveals a value T = T ′ . Since C 1 is (ε, s 1 )-online-extractable, in each instance of A, this happens with probability at most ε, thus Game 1 and Game 2 are nε-indistinguishable.
Notice that the only machines that use quantum memory in Game 2 are Z, Adv, and n copies of A S . Since A S is s 1 -memory bounded, and QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a we have that the total amount of quantum memory used in Game 2 is bounded by a + ns 1 .
Game 3. We change the machine A to commit to 0 b instead of R i for each i / ∈ T ′ . To see that Game 2 and Game 3 are indistinguishable, we introduce an intermediate hybrid game, Game 3 j , in which only the first j of the commitments to R i , i / ∈ T are replaced by commitments to 0 ℓ . Since at most a + ns 1 qubits of quantum memory are used in Game 2 and therefore also in Game 3 j , and since the C 2 -commitments to R i , i / ∈ T are never opened, from the fact that C 2 is (δ, a+ ns 1 )-BQS-hiding it follows that Game 3 j and Game 3 j+1 are δ-indistinguishable. Note that there are, in the whole game, up to n copies of A and thus up to nc C 2 -commitments to some R i , i / ∈ T . Thus Game 2 = Game 3 0 and Game 3 = Game 3 nc are ncδ-indistinguishable.
Figure 6: Networks occurring in the proof of Lemma 21.
Commit phase (on input committed): -When Bob commits to T using C 1 , the simulator runs the extractor A S for C 1 instead of the honest recipient's program. (Since C 1 has recipient Alice, we write A S , not B S .) Let T ′ denote the value extracted by A S . -The simulator picks R 1 , . . . , R m ∈ {0, 1} b . For each i, Sim commits (honestly) to
-Sim picks a hash function F R ← F, picks a random p R ← {0, 1} ℓ , computes the syndrome σ := S(R), and sends (F, σ, p) to Bob. Game 4. We modify A to set R ′ := R and to send R ′ instead of R to Bob in step O1. This modification is for notational purposes only, Game 3 and Game 4 are perfectly indistinguishable.
Game 5. We modify the way A chooses F, R, R ′ , σ, p: In Game 4, we have
To show that Game 4 and Game 5 are indistinguishable, we use the following claim:
We prove this claim below. Using Claim 1 and the fact that we have n instances of A, we immediately get that Game 4 and Game 5 are n(2 cb+mb/2+ℓ/2−κb−1 )-indistinguishable because the values (R i ) i / ∈T are never used by A (except indirectly through R ′ , σ, and p).
16 Note R ′ can be sampled efficiently since the conditions ∀i ∈ T ′ .Ri = R ′ i , σ = S(R ′ ), and p ⊕ F (R ′ ) = v are a system of linear equations. This uses that S is the syndrome of a linear code, and that F is a family of affine functions.
Finally, note that by construction of Sim, Game 5 and the ideal model are perfectly indistinguishable. Thus the real and the ideal model are γ-indistinguishable with γ := 2nε+ncδ +n(2 cb+mb/2+ℓ/2−κb−1 ). Since ǫ, δ are negligible, and n, c are polynomially-bounded, and 2κb − mb − 2cb − ℓ is superlogarithmic, we have that γ is negligible. Thus π n COM (a, ns 1 )-BQS-UC-emulates (F A→B,ℓ COM ) n in the case of corrupted Bob.
Proof of Claim 1. We now prove the pending Claim 1. Let 
, σ, p (2) ) with η := 2 cb+mb/2+ℓ/2−κb−1 . The leftover hash lemma [HILL99] in the variant from [HU08] states that (F, F (R), R T σ) and (F, U, R T σ) have statistical distance at most λ := 2 |(R T σ)|+|U |/2−H 2 (R)/2−1 where H 2 (R) denotes the collision-entropy of R. (Intuitively, R T σ is considered as leaked information about the source R, and F (R) is the randomness extracted from R.) We have λ = 2 cb+(m−κ)b+ℓ/2−mb/2−1 = η.
Hence (F,
We define the probabilistic function W , which on input (F, R T , p, σ) returns a uniform element from R F,R,p (note that R F,R,p does not depend on
). Furthermore, since W (F, R T , p (1) , σ)) uniformly samples from those R compatible with F , R T , p (1) , and σ, we have that (F, Proof. First, we describe the structure of the real and the ideal model in the case that the party A (Alice) is corrupted: In the real model, we have the environment Z, the adversary Adv, the corruption party A C , and the honest party B (Bob). The adversary controls the corruption party A C , so effectively he controls the communication between Alice and Bob. The environment gets Bob's outputs committed and (open, v). See Figure 8 (a) .
In the ideal model, we have the environment Z, the simulator Sim (to be defined below), the corruption party A C , the dummy-partyB, and the commitment functionality Fix an adversary Adv. To show Lemma 21, we need to find a quantum-polynomial-time simulator Sim with QM(Sim) ≤ nms 2 such that, for any environment Z with QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a, the real model and the ideal model are indistinguishable. This simulator is described in Figure 9 . Note that Sim is quantum-polynomial-time: The extractor B S is quantum-polynomial-time by definition, and computing R * is possible in polynomial-time By definition of online-extractability, and since B * does not use the value extracted by B S , we have that B and B * are δ-indistinguishable. More precisely, for any network S, we have that S ∪ {B} and S ∪ {B * } are δ-indistinguishable. Since online-extractability was defined with respect to non-memory bounded adversaries, this holds even if S is not memory bounded.
As in Lemma 21, we proceed by investigating a sequence of games.
Game 1. In the game Game 1 j , the j-th instance of B is replaced by an instance of B * .
(Note: only one instance is replaced, not the first j instances.) We use the following claim:
Claim 2 Let S be an a-memory bounded network. In an execution of
We prove this claim below. Since C 1 and C 2 are 0-memory bounded, we have that the machine B is 0-memory bounded. QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a. Game 2. This game is defined like the real model, except that we use n instances of B * instead of the n instances of B. Using the fact that B and B * are δ-indistinguishable, we get that the real model and Game 2 are nδ-indistinguishable.
Again using that B and B * are δ-indistinguishable, we get that Pr[v j / ∈ {v ′ j , ⊥} :
Game 2] ≤ η + (n − 1)δ. Since this holds for all j = 1, . . . , n, we get:
Game 3. This game is defined like the real model, except that we use n instances of B + instead of the n instances of B. Notice that Game 2 and Game 3 only differ in the fact that in Game 2 we use instances of B Proof of Claim 2. We now prove the pending Claim 2. Let R, R ′ , R * and T denote the corresponding values as computed by B * . We abbreviate R T := (R i ) i∈T and R ′ T := (R ′ i ) i∈T . By Bad we denote the event that R T = R ′ T and S(R) = σ and R = R * . By construction of B * , v = ⊥ implies R T = R ′ T and S(R) = σ. And v / ∈ {v ′ , ⊥} implies R = R * . Thus v / ∈ {v ′ , ⊥} implies Bad . Therefore, to show Claim 2, it is sufficient to show Pr[Bad ] ≤ η in S ∪ {B * }. To show this, we again proceed using a sequence of games: Game 6. We change B * to commit to some fixed T 0 using C 1 instead of committing to T . We wish to apply the (ε, a)-BQS-hiding property of C 1 in order to show that Pr[Bad :
Game 5] − Pr[Bad : Game 6] ≤ ε. Let B 1 denote the sender in the commitment scheme C 1 . To commit to T (or T 0 ) using C 1 , B * internally runs B 1 . We construct an adversary A ′ 1 that interacts with B 1 . This adversary simulates S ∪ {B * } (with B * as in Game 5) except for the machine B 1 inside B * . Note that in Game 5, only the commit phase of C 1 is executed. We let A ′ 1 output 1 iff Bad happens. We defineB 1 like B 1 , except thatB 1 ignores its input and commits to T 0 . Let P be the probability that A ′ 1 outputs 1 when running with B 1 , and letP be the probability that A ′ 1 outputs 1 when running withB 1 . By construction, P = Pr[Bad : Game 5] andP = Pr[Bad : Game 6]. Thus we only have to show that |P −P | ≤ ǫ. To apply the (ε, a)-BQS-hiding property of C 1 we have to check that A ′ 1 is a-memory bounded. A ′ 1 simulates Z, Adv, and B * . We have QM(Z) + QM(Adv) ≤ a by assumption. But B * contains the extractor B S for C 2 which uses additional s qubits of quantum memory. Yet, B S is executed after the end of the commit phase of C 1 . That is, B * is executed within a single activation of A ′ 1 (since B 1 is not activated any more after the commit phase). Our definition of memory bounded machines allows a machine to use arbitrary memory within a single activation as long as the state before and after the activation is memory bounded. (This follows from the fact that we allow arbitrary superoperators to describe the evolution of a single step in the operation of a machine.) Thus A ′ 1 is a-memory bounded. Hence |P −P | ≤ ǫ and thus Pr[Bad : Game 5] − Pr[Bad : Game 6] ≤ ε.
Game 7. We change B * to choose T only after receiving R ′ . Since T is not used earlier by B * , Pr[Bad : Game 6] = Pr[Bad : Game 7] . Fix values R, R ′ and σ with S(R) = σ. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether there exists an R * with S(R * ) = σ and
, we bound the probability of Bad occurring as follows: Let D := {i : Note that π COM executes all instances of C 2 concurrently, so π COM is constant-round.
General two-party computation
We now show that general two-party computation is possible in the BQS-UC-framework. More precisely, for any arbitrary functionality G, any arbitrary memory-bound a, and any bound n on the number of concurrent instances of the protocol, we construct a constantround protocol π bqs2pc such that π n bqs2pc (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates G n , To construct this protocol, we only need to plug together known results: Theorem 27 (BQS two-party computation) Let G be a classical well-formed probabilistic-polynomial-time functionality. Let n and a be polynomially-bounded. Then there is a polynomially-bounded s and a constant-round 0-memory bounded protocol π bqs2pc not invoking any functionality such that π n bqs2pc (a, s)-BQS-UC-emulates G n .
Proof. By composing the protocols from Theorem 25 and Theorem 24, we get a classical constant-round protocol σ 1 that classical-UC-emulates G and invokes polynomially-many instances of F B→A OT . Using the quantum lifting theorem from [Unr10] , this implies that σ 1 quantum-UC-emulates G. Using the composition theorem (for quantum-UC, [Unr10]), we can compose σ 1 with π QOT (from Theorem 26) and get a constant-round protocol σ 2 that quantum-UC-emulates G and invokes polynomially-many instances of F A→B,1 COM . Using the composition theorem again, we get that σ n 2 quantum-UC-emulates G n . (Remember that in the case of quantum-UC-security, the composition theorem allows for concurrent composition.) By Lemma 4 (iii, iv), σ n 2 (a − nQM(σ 2 ) + s ′′ , s ′ )-BQS-UC-emulates G n for some polynomially-bounded s ′ and all s ′′ . Let m be a polynomial upper bound on the number of instances of F A→B,1 COM invoked by σ 2 . By Theorem 23, there is a polynomially-bounded s ′′ and a constant-round protocol π COM such that π nm COM (a, s ′′ )-BQS-UC-emulates (F A→B,1 COM ) nm . Let π bqs2pc be the protocol resulting from replacing invocations of F A→B,1 COM in σ 2 by invocations of π COM . By Corollary 11, π bqs2pc (a − nQM(σ 2 ), s ′′ + s ′ )-BQS-UC-emulates G n . Since QM(σ 2 ) = 0 by construction, the theorem follows with s := s ′′ + s ′ .
Conclusions
We have defined the BQS-UC model for analyzing protocols in the bounded quantum storage model. We have given a composition theorem that permits us to replace arbitrary subprotocols; the composition theorem does not, however, allow for concurrent composition (except in rare cases where the simulation overhead s is smaller than the memory bound a). We gave a statistically secure commitment protocol in the BQS-UC model. Our protocol allows for concurrent composition of a polynomially-bounded number n of instances of itself, but the protocol's parameters depend on n. Our protocol has an efficient simulator. Combining our result with prior results, we constructed a statistically BQS-UC secure constant-round protocol for general two-party computation without any setup assumption.
Open questions. We believe that the following questions constitute interesting directions for future work:
• Find a protocol that concurrently composes with any polynomial-number n of instances of itself; the protocol's parameters should not depend on n. The protocol should also compose with instances of itself in which Alice and Bob exchanged their roles.
• Find a more efficient construction. Currently, our commitment scheme executes a number of instances of the scheme from Theorem 19. The communication complexity of the latter is in the order of magnitude of the adversary's memory bound a. Is it possible to find a BQS-UC secure commitment scheme whose overall communication complexity is in the order of magnitude of a? Furthermore, can we directly implement an OT in the BQS-UC model without going through the construction from [Unr10]?
• Extend our protocols to tolerate noise on the quantum channel. If the protocols tolerate a sufficient amount of noise, they can be implemented with today's technology. Essentially, this boils down to making the protocols from [KWW09] 
